We investigate the effect of linear independence in the strategies of congestion games on the convergence time of best improvement sequences and on the pure Price of Anarchy. In particular, we consider symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, an interesting class of networks with linearly independent paths, and establish two remarkable properties previously known only for parallel-link games. We show that for arbitrary (non-negative and non-decreasing) latency functions, any best improvement sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in at most as many steps as the number of players, and that for latency functions in class D, the pure Price of Anarchy is at most ρ(D), i.e. it is bounded by the Price of Anarchy for non-atomic congestion games. As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain that for symmetric network congestion games with latency functions in class D, the Price of Stability is at most ρ(D).
in algorithmic game theory. In a congestion game, a finite set of non-cooperative players, each controlling an unsplittable unit of load, compete over a finite set of resources. All players using a resource experience a latency (or cost) given by a nonnegative and non-decreasing function of the resource's load (or congestion). Among a given set of resource subsets (or strategies), each player selects one selfishly trying to minimize her individual cost, that is the sum of the latencies on the resources in the chosen strategy. A natural solution concept is that of a pure Nash equilibrium, a configuration where no player can decrease her individual cost by unilaterally changing her strategy.
The prevailing questions in recent work on congestion games have to do with quantifying the inefficiency due to the players' selfish behaviour (see e.g. [4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 17, 22, 23] ), and bounding the convergence time to pure Nash equilibria if the players select their strategies in a selfish and decentralized fashion (see e.g. [1, 8, 14, 21] ). In this work, we investigate the effect of linear independence in the strategies of congestion games on the convergence time of best improvement sequences and on the inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, we consider symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, an interesting class of networks whose paths are linearly independent in the sense that every path contains an edge not included in any other path. For this class of congestion games, which comprises a natural and non-trivial generalization of the extensively studied class of parallel-link games (see e.g. [7, 14, 17, [21] [22] [23] ]), we provide best possible answers to both research questions above.
Convergence Time to Pure Nash Equilibria
In a seminal paper, Rosenthal [26] proved that the pure Nash equilibria of congestion games correspond to the local optima of a natural potential function. Hence Rosenthal established that every congestion game admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium reached in a natural way when players iteratively make best improvement moves, i.e. adopt strategies that minimize their individual cost given the strategies of other players. Nevertheless, this may take an exponential number of steps, since computing a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete for non-symmetric network congestion games as shown by Fabrikant et al. [15] . In fact, the proof of Fabrikant et al. establishes the existence of instances where any sequence of players' best improvement moves is exponentially long. Even for symmetric network congestion games, where a pure Nash equilibrium can be found efficiently by a min-cost flow computation [15] , Ackermann et al. [1] presented a class of instances where any best improvement sequence is exponentially long.
A natural approach to circumvent the strong negative results of [1, 15] is to resort to approximate pure Nash equilibria, where no player can significantly improve her individual cost by unilaterally changing her strategy. Chien and Sinclair [8] considered symmetric congestion games with a weak restriction on latency functions and proved that several natural families of best improvement sequences converge to an approximate equilibrium in polynomial time.
An orthogonal approach is to identify interesting classes of congestion games for which best improvement sequences reach a pure Nash equilibrium in a polynomial number of steps. For instance, it is well known that for symmetric singleton congestion games (aka parallel-link games) with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions, any best improvement sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in at most n steps, where n denotes the number of players. Ieong et al. [21] proved that even for non-symmetric singleton games with non-monotonic latencies, best improvement sequences reach a pure Nash equilibrium in a polynomial number of steps. Subsequently, Ackermann et al. [1] generalized this result to matroid congestion games, where the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a matroid over the set of resources. Furthermore, Ackermann et al. proved that the matroid property on the players' strategy spaces is necessary for guaranteeing polynomial convergence of best improvement sequences if one does not take into account the global structure of the game.
Contribution
The negative results of [1, 15] leave open the possibility that some particular classes of symmetric network congestion games can guarantee fast convergence of best improvement sequences to pure Nash equilibria. In Sect. 3, we prove that for symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks with arbitrary (non-negative and non-decreasing) latency functions, any best improvement sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in at most n steps 1 (Theorem 1). In particular, we show that in any best improvement sequence, every player moves at most once (Lemma 1). This result is best possible, since there are instances where reaching a pure Nash equilibrium requires that every player moves at least once. To the best of our knowledge, symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks is the only non-trivial generalization of parallel-link games for which such a strong bound on the convergence time of best improvement sequences is known.
Inefficiency of Pure Nash Equilibria
Having reached a pure Nash equilibrium, selfish players enjoy a minimum individual cost given the strategies of other players. However, the public benefit is usually measured by the total cost incurred by all players. Since a pure Nash equilibrium does not need to minimize the total cost, one seeks to quantify the inefficiency due to the players' non-cooperative and selfish behaviour. The Price of Anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [22] , and the Price of Stability, introduced by Anshelevich et al. [5] , are the prevailing measures of the performance degradation due to the players' non-cooperative and selfish behaviour. The (pure) Price of Anarchy (PoA) (resp. Price of Stability, PoS) is the worst-case (resp. best-case) ratio of the total cost of a (pure) Nash equilibrium to the optimal total cost. 1 We highlight that matroid games and games on extension-parallel networks have a different combinatorial structure and may have quite different properties. For example, a network consisting of two parallel-link networks connected in series is not extension-parallel, while the corresponding network congestion game is a symmetric matroid game. For another example, Milchtaich [25, Example 4] proved that weighted congestion games on extension-parallel networks may not admit a pure Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, Ackermann et al. [2, Theorem 2] proved that every weighted matroid congestion game admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
Many recent contributions have provided strong upper and lower bounds on the pure Price of Anarchy for several classes of congestion games, mostly congestion games with affine and polynomial latency functions and congestion games on parallel links. 2 Lücking et al. [23] and Suri et al. [29] were the first to consider the PoA of atomic congestion games for the objective of total cost. For (symmetric) parallel-link games with linear latency functions, Lücking et al. proved that the PoA is 4/3. For non-symmetric singleton games with linear latency functions, Suri et al. proved that the PoA is at most 5/2, which was later shown to be tight [7] . For parallel-link games with polynomial latency functions of degree d, Gairing et al. [17] proved the PoA is at most d + 1. Awerbuch et al. [6] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [9] proved independently that the PoA of congestion games is 5/2 for affine latency functions and d (d) for polynomial latency functions of degree d. Subsequently, Aland et al. [4] obtained exact bounds on the PoA of congestion games with polynomial latency functions. In the non-atomic setting, where the number of players is infinite and each player controls an infinitesimal amount of load, Roughgarden [27] proved that the PoA is independent of the strategy space and equal to ρ(D), where ρ depends on the class of latency functions D only (e.g. ρ is equal to 4/3 for affine and
for quadratic functions). Subsequently, Correa et al. [11] 
and gave a simple proof of the same bound. Recently Fotakis [16] and independently Caragiannis et al. [7, Theorem 23] proved that the PoA of (atomic) parallel-link games with latency functions in class D is at most ρ(D), i.e. it is bounded by the PoA of non-atomic congestion games with arbitrary strategies.
There is no difference between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability for non-atomic congestion games, since the Nash equilibrium in the non-atomic setting is essentially unique (under mild assumptions on the latency functions, see e.g. [28] ). In the atomic setting, Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [10] proved that the PoS of congestion games with affine latencies lies between 1 + √ 3/3 and 1.6. Subsequently, Caragiannis et al. [7, Theorem 6] proved that the PoS of affine congestion games is 1 + √ 3/3, and that for non-symmetric singleton games with latency functions in class D, the PoS is at most ρ(D).
Contribution Despite the considerable interest in the PoA and the PoS of congestion games, it remains open whether some better upper bounds close to ρ are possible for symmetric games on simple networks other than parallel links (e.g. extensionparallel networks, series-parallel networks), or strong lower bounds similar to the lower bounds of [4, 6, 9, 10 ] also apply to them. As a first step in this direction, we prove in Sect. 4 that the PoA of symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks with latency functions in class D is at most ρ(D) (Theorem 3). On the negative side, we show that this result cannot be further generalized to series-parallel networks. In particular, we present an example of a 3-player symmetric game on a simple series-parallel network with linear latencies for which the PoA is 15/11, greater than the value of ρ for linear latencies. To the best of our knowledge, symmetric games on extension-parallel networks is the only non-trivial generalization of parallel-link games for which such a strong bound on the pure Price of Anarchy is known.
To establish the upper bound of ρ(D) on the PoA of symmetric games on extension-parallel networks, we show two properties of symmetric games that may be of independent interest. In particular, we prove that (i) for symmetric games on general networks with latencies in class D, the total cost of any configuration minimizing Rosenthal's potential function is at most ρ(D) times the optimal total cost (Lemmas 2 and 3, see also [5, Theorem 3.4] ), and that (ii) for symmetric games on extension-parallel networks, every pure Nash equilibrium is a global minimum of Rosenthal's potential function (Lemma 4, also implicit in the work of Holzman and Law-Yone [19, Theorem 6.1]).
The first property implies an upper bound of ρ(D) on the PoS of symmetric network congestion games with latency functions in class D (Theorem 2), which was also obtained by Anshelevich et al. [5, Theorem 3.4] . 3 For instance, this implies that the PoS of symmetric network games with affine latencies is at most 4/3, i.e. better than the bound of 1 + √ 3/3 known for general congestion games.
Related Work on Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Strategies
There has been a significant volume of previous work investigating the impact of linearly independent strategies on properties of congestion games. In [19] , Holzman and Law-Yone proved that a strategy space admits a strong equilibrium 4 for any selection of (non-negative and non-decreasing) latency functions if and only if it does not contain a so-called bad configuration, which is defined as a triplet of strategies s 1 , s 2 , s 3 such that s 1 includes some resource e 1 not belonging to s 2 , s 2 includes some resource e 2 not belonging to s 1 , and s 3 includes both resources e 1 and e 2 . Furthermore, they proved that in a strategy space without a bad configuration, every strategy s contains a resource not included in any other strategy that is not a superset of s. Holzman and Law-Yone showed that for symmetric congestion games without a bad configuration, every pure Nash equilibrium is a strong equilibrium. Subsequently, Holzman and Law-Yone [20] proved that the class of symmetric congestion games on extensionparallel networks is the network equivalent of symmetric congestion games without a bad configuration. Milchtaich [24] was the first to consider networks with linearly independent paths (under this name). Milchtaich proved that an undirected network has linearly independent paths if and only if it is extension-parallel, and if and only if it does not contain a triplet of paths comprising a bad configuration. Moreover, Milchtaich showed that networks with linearly independent paths is the only class of networks where for any selection of non-negative and increasing (resp. non-decreasing) latency functions, all equilibria in the non-atomic setting are Pareto (resp. weakly Pareto) efficient.
Recently Epstein et al. [12, 13] considered fair connection games 5 and congestion games on extension-parallel networks. In [13] , Epstein et al. proved that fair connection games on extension-parallel networks admit a strong equilibrium. In [12] , Epstein et al. showed that extension-parallel networks is the only class of networks where for any selection of (non-negative and non-decreasing) latency functions, every pure Nash equilibrium minimizes the maximum players' cost.
Model and Preliminaries
For any integer k ≥ 1, we denote [k] ≡ {1, . . . , k}. For a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we denote x −i ≡ (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) and (x −i , x i ) ≡ (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i , x i+1 , . . . , x n ).
Congestion Games
A congestion game is a tuple (N, E, ( i ) i∈N , (d e ) e∈E ), where N denotes the set of players, E denotes the set of resources, i ⊆ 2 E \ {∅} denotes the strategy space of each player i, and d e : N → R ≥0 is a non-negative and non-decreasing latency function associated with each resource e. A congestion game is symmetric if all players have a common strategy space. In the following, we let n denote the number of players.
A configuration is a vector σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) consisting of a strategy σ i ∈ i for each player i. For every resource e, we let σ e = |{i ∈ N : e ∈ σ i }| denote the congestion induced on e by σ . The individual cost of player i in the configuration σ is c i (σ ) = e∈σ i d e (σ e ). A configuration σ is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player can improve her individual cost by unilaterally changing her strategy. Formally, σ is a Nash equilibrium if for every player i and every strategy
Rosenthal [26] introduced the potential function
and proved that when a player i switches from her current strategy σ i to a new strategy s i ∈ i , the difference in the potential value equals the difference in the individual cost of player i, i.e.
Thus Rosenthal established that congestion games (even with non-monotonic latency functions) admit a pure Nash equilibrium, and that the pure Nash equilibria of a congestion game correspond to the local minima of the potential function . For symmetric network congestion games with arbitrary (non-negative and non-decreasing) latency functions, Fabrikant et al. [15, Theorem 2] proved that the global minimum of the potential function , and thus a pure Nash equilibrium, can be computed in polynomial time by a min-cost flow computation. In this work, we focus on symmetric network congestion games, where the players' strategies are determined by a directed network G(V , E) with a distinguished source s and sink t (aka a s − t network). The network edges play the role of resources and the common strategy space of the players is the set of (simple) s − t paths in G, denoted P. For any s − t path p and any pair of vertices v 1 
Flows and Configurations
Let G(V , E) be a directed network with source s and sink t. A s − t flow f is a vector (f e ) e∈E ∈ R m ≥0 that satisfies the flow conservation at all vertices other than s and t. The volume of f is the total flow leaving s. A flow f is acyclic if there is no directed cycle in G with positive flow on all its edges. For a flow f and a path p ∈ P, we let
Given a configuration σ of a symmetric network congestion game , we refer to the congestion vector (σ e ) e∈E as the s − t flow induced by σ . We say that a flow f is feasible if there is a configuration inducing congestion f e on every edge e. Hence any configuration of corresponds to a feasible flow, while a feasible flow may be induced by many different configurations. Moreover, every integer acyclic s − t flow of volume n corresponds to (possibly many) configurations of , and thus is feasible. We say that a configuration is acyclic if the corresponding feasible flow is acyclic. In the following, we slightly abuse the notation by letting the same symbol denote both a configuration and the feasible flow induced by it.
Best Improvement Sequences
A strategy s i ∈ i is a best response of player i to a configuration σ (or equivalently to σ −i ) if for every strategy
. If the current strategy σ i of player i is not a best response to the current configuration σ , a best response of i to σ is called a best improvement of player i. We consider best improvement sequences, where in each step, a player i whose strategy σ i is not a best response to the current configuration σ switches to her best improvement. The existence of the potential function implies that any best improvement sequence converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. In the first part of this work, we are interested in bounding the maximum length of best improvement sequences for symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks.
Social Cost, Price of Anarchy, and Price of Stability
In the second part of this work, we are interested in quantifying the inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria for symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks and on general networks. We evaluate configurations using the objective of total cost. The total cost C(σ ) of a configuration σ is the sum of players' individual costs in σ , i.e.
The optimal configuration, denoted o, minimizes the total cost among all configurations in P n .
The pure Price of Anarchy (PoA) of a congestion game is the maximum ratio C(σ )/C(o) over all pure Nash equilibria σ of . The pure Price of Stability (PoS) of is the minimum ratio C(σ )/C(o) over all pure Nash equilibria σ of . In other words, the pure PoA (resp. PoS) is equal to C(σ )/C(o), where σ is 's pure Nash equilibrium of maximum (resp. minimum) total cost. Hence the pure PoA (resp. PoS) of is bounded from above by a number α if all pure Nash equilibria (resp. some pure Nash equilibrium) of have (resp. has) total cost at most α times the optimal total cost.
We use the quantities ρ(D) and β(D) introduced in [11, 27] respectively, to bound the PoS of symmetric network congestion games and the PoA of symmetric games on extension-parallel networks. For a non-negative and non-decreasing function
xd (x) .
For a non-empty class of non-negative and non-decreasing functions
D, let ρ(D) ≡ sup d∈D ρ(d), and let β(D) ≡ sup d∈D β(d). We note that (1 − β(D)) −1 = ρ(D).
Extension-Parallel Networks
Let G 1 (V 1 , E 1 ) and G 2 (V 2 , E 2 ) be two networks with source s 1 ∈ V 1 and s 2 ∈ V 2 and sink t 1 ∈ V 1 and t 2 ∈ V 2 respectively, and let G (V 1 ∪ V 2 , E 1 ∪ E 2 ) be the union network of G 1 and G 2 . The parallel composition of G 1 and G 2 results in a s − t network obtained from G by identifying s 1 and s 2 to the source s and identifying t 1 and t 2 to the sink t. The series composition of G 1 and G 2 results in a s − t network obtained from G by letting s 1 be the source s, letting t 2 be the sink t, and identifying t 1 with s 2 .
A directed s − t network is series-parallel if it consists of either a single edge (s, t) or two series-parallel networks composed either in series or in parallel. A directed s − t network is extension-parallel if it consists of either: (i) a single edge (s, t), (ii) a single edge and an extension-parallel network composed in series, or (iii) two extension-parallel networks composed in parallel. Every extension-parallel network is series-parallel. The converse is true only if in every series composition, at least one component is a single edge.
The following proposition gives a useful property of series-parallel (and thus of extension-parallel) networks. For completeness, we prove the proposition in the Appendix, Sect. A.1.
Proposition 1 Let G(V , E) be a series-parallel s − t network, and let u, w be two vertices connected by two internally disjoint paths p and p . Then every s − t path having an edge in common with p contains both u and w and does not intersect p at any vertex other than u and w.
A s − t network has linearly independent paths if every s − t path contains at least one edge not belonging to any other s − t path. 6 Milchtaich [24, Proposition 5] proved that an undirected s − t network has linearly independent paths if and only if it is extension-parallel. Therefore, every (directed) extension-parallel network has linearly independent paths (see also [20, Theorem 1] ). Furthermore, [24, Propositions 3 and 5] imply that a (directed) series-parallel network has linearly independent paths if and only if it is extension-parallel.
The following proposition gives a useful property of extension-parallel networks (for a proof, see [24, Proposition 4] Proposition 2 implies that for any two paths p and p of an extension-parallel network, the segments p \ p and p \ p where p and p deviate from each other are two internally disjoint paths with common endpoints.
The following proposition gives an interesting property of networks with linearly independent paths (and thus of extension-parallel networks). Proof We first consider the case where π is a s − t path. Since G is a s − t network with linearly independent paths, there exists an edge e ∈ π not belonging to any other s − t path. Let i be any player whose strategy in f includes e (such a player exists because f e > 0). Then the strategy of player i in f is π (since e would not be included in f i otherwise).
Proposition 3 Let be a symmetric congestion game on a s − t network G with linearly independent paths, let
If π is not a s − t path, let u and w be the endpoints of π . Since f corresponds to a s − t flow with f min π > 0, there is a s − u path π 1 with f min π 1 > 0 (π 1 is empty if u is s) and a w − t path π 2 with f min
is a s − t path with f min p > 0. As shown before, there is a player i whose strategy in f is p, which includes π .
Every configuration of a symmetric congestion game on a series-parallel (and thus on an extension-parallel) network corresponds to a (feasible) acyclic flow of volume n. Proposition 3 implies that for every symmetric congestion game on an extension-parallel s − t network, any acyclic s − t flow of volume n corresponds to a unique configuration of (uniqueness is up to players' permutation). Therefore, for symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, there is a correspondence between configurations and feasible acyclic flows.
Convergence Time to Pure Nash Equilibria
In this section, we prove that for symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, any best improvement sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in at most n steps. The proof is based on the following lemma establishing that in any best improvement sequence, every player moves at most once.
Lemma 1 Let be a symmetric congestion game on an extension-parallel network, let σ be the current configuration, and let i be a player switching from her current strategy σ i to her best improvement σ i . Then for every player j whose current strategy σ j is a best response to σ , σ j remains a best response of j to the new configuration
Proof For sake of contradiction, we assume that there is a player j whose current strategy σ j is a best response to σ but not to σ . Let σ j be the best response of j to σ , and let p = σ j \ σ j and p = σ j \ σ j be the segments where σ j and σ j deviate from each other. Due to the extension-parallel structure of the network (see also Proposition 2), p and p are internally disjoint paths with common endpoints, denoted u and w (u may be s and w may be t).
Since p and p are edge-disjoint paths and player j improves her individual cost in σ by switching from p to p , 
Using the inequality above and the hypothesis that σ i is a best improvement of player i to σ , and exploiting the extension-parallel structure of the network, we establish that if player j prefers σ j to σ j in the new configuration σ , then σ j is not a best response of j to σ . In particular, we show that player j can also improve her individual cost in σ by switching from an appropriate segment of σ j to the corresponding segment of σ i . The precise structure of these segments depends on the subgraph defined by σ j , σ j , σ i , and σ i , and dictates the different cases considered in the proof (see also Fig. 1) . In all cases, we obtain a contradiction to the hypothesis that σ j is a best response of j to σ .
The technical part of the proof proceeds by case analysis. At a high level, we distinguish between two cases depending on whether σ i contains both u and w, in which case σ i [u, w] can serve as an alternative to p, or not.
Case I: u, w ∈ σ i We first consider the case where σ i contains u and w. We further distinguish between two subcases depending on whether p and σ i are edge-disjoint or not.
Case Ia: p ∩ σ i = ∅ We start with the case where p and σ i are edge-disjoint. We first consider the case where σ i [u, w] \ p does not contain any edges of σ i (see e.g. 
For the first inequality, we use that when player i switches from σ i to σ i : (i) the congestion of any edge e in σ i does not decrease (i.e. ∀e ∈ σ i , σ e ≥ σ e ), (ii) the congestion of any edge e decreases by at most 1 (i.e. ∀e, σ e ≥ σ e − 1), and (iii) the congestion of any edge e not in σ i or σ i does not change (i.e. ∀e ∈ σ i ∪ σ i , σ e = σ e ).
For the second inequality, we observe that the marked terms on the left-hand side is the individual cost of player i on p \ σ i in σ (i.e. when the configuration of the remaining players is σ −i ) and that the marked term on the right-hand side is the individual cost of player i on σ i [u, w] \ p in σ (recall that we consider the case where σ i [u, w] \ p does not contain any edges of σ i ). Since σ i is a best response of player i to σ −i , the former cost is no less than the latter. Using (2), we conclude that player j can improve her individual cost in σ by changing her path between u and w from p to σ i [u, w] The first inequality holds because p ∩ σ i = ∅. Therefore, for all e ∈ p, σ e ≥ σ e , since the congestion of any edge not in σ i does not increase when player i switches from σ i to σ i . The second inequality is (1), and the third inequality is (2) .
If σ i [u, w] \ p contains some edges of σ i , we show that due to the extensionparallel structure of the network, the congestion of the edges in p and p does not change when player i switches from σ i to σ i (see Fig. 1b ). This contradicts the hypothesis that the best response of player j changes from σ j to σ j when player i moves from σ i to σ i .
We first show that the congestion of the edges of p does not change when player i switches from σ i to σ i . Since u and w are connected by two internally disjoint paths p and σ i [u, w] Fig. 1c) 
The first inequality holds because the congestion of any edge not in σ i does not increase when player i switches from σ i to σ i (i.e. ∀e ∈ σ i , σ e ≥ σ e ). The second inequality is (1). The third inequality holds because when player i switches from σ i to σ i : (i) the congestion of any edge decreases by at most 1 (i.e. ∀e, σ e ≥ σ e − 1), and (ii) the congestion of any edge not in σ i does not decrease (i.e. ∀e ∈ σ i , σ e ≥ σ e ). For the fourth inequality, we observe that the left-hand side is equal to the individual cost of player i on p in σ (i.e. when the configuration of the remaining players is σ −i ), and that the right-hand side is equal to the cost of player i on σ i [u, w] [u, w] and p (instead of p in the subcase of Ia), we show that the congestion of the edges in p and p does not change when player i switches from σ i to σ i . This contradicts the hypothesis that the best response of player j changes from σ j to σ j when player i moves from σ i to σ i . For completeness, we include the details in the Appendix, Sect. A.2.
Case II: Either u ∈ σ i or w ∈ σ i We proceed with the case where σ i does not contain at least one of u and w. Then, by Proposition 1, σ i does have any edges in common with both p and p .
If σ i too does not contain at least one of u and w, then σ i does not have any edges in common with both p and p . Therefore, the congestion of the edges in p and p does not change when player i switches from σ i to σ i . This contradicts the hypothesis that the best response of player j changes from σ j to σ j when player i moves from σ i to σ i .
Hence we restrict our attention to the case where σ i contains both u and w. Let σ i \ σ i and σ i \ σ i be the segments where σ i and σ i deviate from each other. Since σ i does not contain either u or w (or both) and σ i contains both u and w, σ i \ σ i and σ i \ σ i are non-empty. By Proposition 2, σ i \ σ i and σ i \ σ i are (non-empty) internally disjoint path segments with common endpoints, denoted u and w . Their first endpoint u appears no later than u and their last endpoint w appears no sooner than w on σ i and σ i (see e.g. Fig. 1e ). Furthermore, either u is different from u or w is different from w (or both). By Proposition 2 and since σ i deviates from at least one of p and p between u and w, there is a unique path σ i [u , u] 
The first inequality holds because the edges of p are not included in σ i , and the congestion of any edge not in σ i does not increase when player i moves from σ i to σ i (i.e. ∀e ∈ σ i , σ e ≥ σ e ). The second inequality follows from (1). The third inequality holds because when player i switches from σ i to σ i : (i) the congestion of any edge decreases by at most 1 (i.e. ∀e, σ e ≥ σ e − 1), and (ii) the congestion of any edge not in σ i does not decrease (i.e. ∀e ∈ σ i , σ e ≥ σ e ). For the fourth inequality, we observe that the left-hand side is equal to the individual cost of player i on
e. when the configuration of the remaining players is σ −i ), and that the right-hand side is equal to the individual cost of player i on σ i [u , w ] in σ (recall that σ i [u , w ] and σ i [u , w ] are edge disjoint). Since σ i is a best response of player i to σ −i , the former cost is not less than the latter. Thus (4) implies that player j can decrease her individual cost in σ by switching from σ j [u , w ] to σ i [u , w ] . This contradicts the hypothesis that σ j is a best response of player j to σ . Since we have reached a contradiction in all different cases, this concludes the proof of the lemma.
By Lemma 1, once a player finds herself on her best response strategy, she will not have an incentive to deviate as long as the remaining players switch to their best improvement strategies. Hence we obtain the main result of this section:
Theorem 1 For any n-player symmetric congestion game on an extension-parallel network, every best improvement sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in at most n steps.
Bounding the Inefficiency of Pure Nash Equilibria
We proceed to establish an upper bound of ρ(D) on the PoS of symmetric network congestion games and on the PoA of symmetric games on extension parallel networks. We start with a technical property of the configurations of symmetric network congestion games that minimize the potential function (cf. Lemma 2). Based on this property and on the definition of β(D), we prove that for symmetric network games, the total cost of any global minimum of is at most (1 − β(D) ) −1 = ρ(D) times the optimal total cost (cf. Lemma 3). Since a global minimum of is also a local minimum, and thus a pure Nash equilibrium, we obtain that the PoS of symmetric network congestion games with latency functions in class D is at most ρ(D) (cf. Theorem 2). Furthermore, we show that for symmetric games on extension-parallel networks, every pure Nash equilibria is a global minimum of the potential function (cf. Lemma 4). Therefore, for symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks with latency functions in class D, the PoA is at most ρ(D) (cf. Theorem 3). 
Lemma 2 Let be a symmetric network congestion game, and let G(V , E) be the underlying s − t network. An acyclic configuration f of minimizes the potential function if and only if for every configuration
configurations g, and f is a global minimum of the potential function . For the converse, let f be an acyclic configuration that minimizes , and let g be any acyclic configuration of . The assumption that g is acyclic can be made without loss of generality, since any configuration g can be turned into an acyclic configuration g with g e ≤ g e for all e ∈ E, which implies that (f, g ) ≤ (f, g). In the following, we assume that the configurations f and g are not identical, and consider the corresponding feasible s − t flows.
LetĜ(V ,Ê) be the network of the flow g − f . In particular, for each edge (u, w) ∈ E,Ê contains a forward edge (u, w) with flow g (u,w) − f (u,w) if g (u,w) > f (u,w) , a backward edge (w, u) with flow f (u,w) − g (u,w) if g (u,w) < f (u,w) , and no edge between u and w if f (u,w) = g (u,w) . For a (directed) cycle C inĜ, let
be the set of edges of the original network G corresponding to the forward edges of C, let
be the set of edges of the original network G (with their directions as in E) corresponding to the backward edges of C, and let
be the cost (with respect to f ) of cycle C. Next we establish the following two claims, which directly imply lemma: (i) if f is acyclic and a global minimum of the potential function , then for every acyclic configuration g, the networkĜ of the flow g − f does not contain any cycles C with cost f (C) < 0, and (ii) if every cycle C in the networkĜ of the flow g − f has cost f (C) ≥ 0, then (f, g) ≤ 0. We first establish claim (ii). Since f and g are acyclic s − t flows of the same volume, a flow decomposition of g − f yields only cycles and no paths ofĜ. Let {C 1 , . . . , C k } be the set of (directed, simple) cycles ofĜ produced by the standard flow decomposition of g − f (see e.g. the algorithm in [3, Theorem 3.5]), and let s i be the amount of flow carried by each cycle C i in the decomposition of g − f . Since g and f are acyclic s − t flows, every cycle C i contains at least one forward and at least one backward edge (i.e. both C 
Hence, ifĜ does not contain any (simple) cycles of negative cost (with respect to f ), then (f, g) ≤ 0. This concludes the proof of claim (ii).
We proceed to establish claim (i), namely that if f is a global minimum of the potential function , thenĜ does not contain any cycles of negative cost (with respect to f ). For sake of contradiction, we assume that there is a (directed) cycle C inĜ with cost f (C) < 0. Given the flow f and the cycle C, we construct a s − t flow f of volume n by increasing the flow by one unit on the edges of C + , decreasing the flow by one unit on the edges of C − , and keeping the same flow on the remaining edges. By construction, the potential value of f is (f ) = (f ) + cost f (C) < (f ), because cost f (C) < 0. Since f and g are feasible acyclic s − t flows, f is a s − t flow of volume n. In case where f is not acyclic (and thus not feasible), we cancel the flow along all cycles in f , and obtain a feasible acyclic s − t flow f . Since this modification does not increase the amount of flow on any edge of the network, we have that f e ≤ f e for all e ∈ E, and that (f ) ≤ (f ). Therefore, there exists a configuration of of potential value less than (f ), which contradicts the hypothesis that f is a global minimum of . This concludes the proof of claim (i), and the proof of the lemma.
The following lemma bounds the total cost of configurations (of symmetric network games) that minimize the potential function in terms of the optimal total cost. The proof follows from the definition of ρ(D) and Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 Let be a symmetric network congestion game with latency functions in class D, let f be an acyclic configuration of that minimizes the potential function
, and let o be the optimal configuration. Then, Using (7), (8), and Lemma 2, we obtain that: Every symmetric network congestion game admits an acyclic configuration that minimizes the potential function . Since the global minimum of is also a local minimum, and thus a pure Nash equilibrium, Lemma 3 implies that every symmetric network game with latencies in class D admits a pure Nash equilibrium of total cost at most ρ(D) times the optimal total cost.
Theorem 2 For any symmetric network congestion game with latency functions in class D, the PoS is at most ρ(D).
For symmetric games on extension-parallel networks, configurations are acyclic and every pure Nash equilibrium is a global minimum of the potential function (cf. Lemma 4) . Therefore, by Lemma 3, for symmetric games on extension-parallel networks with latency functions in class D, the total cost of any pure Nash equilibrium is at most ρ(D) times the optimal total cost.
Theorem 3 For symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks with latency functions in class D, the PoA is at most ρ(D).
To conclude the proof of Theorem 3, we have to show that:
Lemma 4 Every pure Nash equilibrium of a symmetric congestion game on an extension-parallel network is a global minimum of the potential function .
Proof 7 Let be a symmetric congestion game on an extension-parallel network G(V , E), and let f be any pure Nash equilibrium of . We show that for every configuration g of , (f, g) ≤ 0. Then by Lemma 2 (if-part), f is a global minimum of the potential function . To establish that (f, g) ≤ 0, we consider the network G(V ,Ê) of the flow g − f , and show that if f is a pure Nash equilibrium, the cost (with respect to f ) of any (directed) simple cycle inĜ is non-negative (i.e. this corresponds to claim (i) in the proof of Lemma 2, only-if-part, claim (ii) holds with the same proof).
In the following, we use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 2. We recall (6) ), where {C 1 , . . . , C k } is the set of (directed, simple) cycles produced by the standard flow decomposition of g − f , and s i is the amount of flow carried by each cycle C i in the decomposition of f − g (recall that f, g are acyclic, as configurations of a symmetric game on an extension-parallel network). Therefore to establish that (f, g) ≤ 0, it suffices to prove that for every (simple) cycle C i in the decomposition of g − f , cost f (C i ) ≥ 0.
In fact, we prove that for every simple cycle C ofĜ, cost f (C) ≥ 0, which by the discussion above, implies the lemma. The crux of the proof is to show that due to extension-parallel structure of the network, every simple cycle C ofĜ contains two vertices u, w such that C + and C − are two internally disjoint u − w paths in the original network G (cf. Proposition 4). Then the claim follows from the hypothesis that f is a pure Nash equilibrium. More precisely, since C − consists of backward edges only, f e > 0 for all e ∈ C − . Hence by Proposition 3, there is a player i whose strategy in f includes C − . Therefore, e∈C − d e (f e ) ≤ e∈C + d e (f e + 1), since otherwise player i could switch from C − to C + between u and w and improve her individual cost, which contradicts the hypothesis that f is a pure Nash equilibrium. Consequently, for every simple cycle C ofĜ, cost f (C) ≥ 0.
To conclude the proof of the lemma, we have to show that the forward and the backward part of every cycle C inĜ correspond to two internally paths in the extension-parallel network G. Proof We prove only the first part, namely that any (simple) s − t path inĜ consists of forward edges only. The second part concerning t − s paths follows by applying the first part to the flow f − g.
Proposition 4 Let
The proof is by induction on the extension-parallel structure of the network. The proposition holds if the network consists of a single edge (s, t). We inductively assume that the proposition holds for any extension-parallel network with less edges than G.
If G is the parallel composition of two extension-parallel s − t networks G 1 and G 2 , since g (resp. f ) is an acyclic s − t flow, it can be decomposed into an acyclic s − t flow g 1 (resp. f 1 ) going through G 1 , and an acyclic s − t flow g 2 (resp. f 2 ) going through G 2 . More precisely, g 1 (resp. f 1 ) is defined on G 1 only and is equal to g e (resp. f e ) on every edge e of G 1 . Similarly, g 2 (resp. f 2 ) is defined on G 2 only and is equal to g e (resp. f e ) on every edge e of G 2 . LetĜ 1 (resp.Ĝ 2 ) be the network of the flow g 1 − f 1 (resp. g 2 − f 2 ). ThenĜ is the parallel composition ofĜ 1 and G 2 , and any s − t path inĜ goes through eitherĜ 1 orĜ 2 . The proposition follows from the induction hypothesis stating that s − t paths inĜ 1 
t).
We proceed to establish Proposition 4, namely that for every simple cycle C of G, there are vertices u, w on C such that C + and C − are two internally disjoint u − w paths in G. The proof is by induction on the extension-parallel structure of the network. If the network consists of a single edge (s, t), the proposition holds trivially becauseĜ does not contain any cycles. We inductively assume that the proposition holds for any extension-parallel network with less edges than G.
If G is the series composition of an edge (s, s 1 ) and an extension-parallel s 1 − t network G 1 , no cycle ofĜ contains s. Thus the vertex s and the edge (s, s 1 ) can be ignored. Let g 1 (resp. f 1 ) be the acyclic flow obtained from g (resp. f ) by ignoring the (flow on) edge (s, s 1 ), and letĜ 1 be the network of the flow g 1 − f 1 . Then every simple cycle C ofĜ is also a simple cycle ofĜ 1 (and vice versa), and the proposition follows from the induction hypothesis. The same argument applies when G is the series composition of an extension-parallel s − t 1 network G 1 and an edge (t 1 , t) .
If G is the parallel composition of two extension-parallel s − t networks G 1 and G 2 , since g (resp. f ) is an acyclic s − t flow, it can be decomposed into an acyclic s − t flow g 1 (resp. f 1 ) going through G 1 , and an acyclic s − t flow g 2 (resp. f 2 ) going through G 2 defined as in the proof of Proposition 5. LetĜ 1 (resp.Ĝ 2 ) be the network of the flow g 1 − f 1 (resp. g 2 − f 2 ). ThenĜ is the parallel composition ofĜ 1 andĜ 2 . Therefore every simple cycle C ofĜ either lies entirely insideĜ 1 (orĜ 2 ) or consists of an s − t path p + inĜ 1 (resp.Ĝ 2 ) followed by a t − s path p − inĜ 2 (resp.Ĝ 1 ). In the former case, the proposition follows from the induction hypothesis. In the latter case, by Proposition 5, the s − t path p + consists of forward edges only and the t − s path p − consists of backward edges only. Hence C + = p + and C − = {(u, w) ∈ E : (w, u) ∈ p − }, and C + and C − are two internally disjoint s − t paths in G.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
Remark The PoA may be greater than ρ(D) even for series-parallel networks with linear latencies. For example, let us consider the 3-player game in Fig. 2 . Since the latency functions are linear, ρ = 4/3. In the optimal configuration o, every edge has congestion 1 and the total cost is C(o) = 11 (e.g. an optimal configuration is obtained by assigning the first player to the upper path (e 1 , e 3 , e 5 ), the second player to the middle path (e 2 , e 4 , e 6 ), and the third player to the lower path (e 7 )). On the other hand, there is a pure Nash equilibrium f where the first player is assigned to (e 1 , e 3 , e 6 ), the second player to (e 1 , e 4 , e 5 ), and the third player to (e 2 , e 3 , e 5 ). Each player incurs an individual cost of 5 and does not have an incentive to deviate to e 7 . The total cost is C(f ) = 15 and the PoA is 15/11 > 4/3. In addition, we observe that f is not a global minimum of the potential function (this follows from Lemma 3 as well). In fact, (f ) = 12, while the optimal configuration has (o) = 11 and is the global minimum of (and thus a pure Nash equilibrium). Although Proposition 4 holds for the more general class of series-parallel networks, Lemma 4 fails in this example because Proposition 3 does not hold for series-parallel networks (and for the network in Fig. 2 in particular) .
Conclusions
In this work, we considered symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, an interesting and non-trivial generalization of parallel-link games, and established two remarkable properties previously known only for parallel-link games. In particular, we proved that for arbitrary (non-negative and non-decreasing) latency functions, any best improvement sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in at most n steps, and that for latency functions in class D, the PoA is at most ρ(D). Moreover, our analysis implies that for symmetric network games with latency functions in class D, the PoS is at most ρ(D).
An interesting direction for further research is to investigate whether similar properties hold for more general classes of symmetric network congestion games. For instance, it would be quite interesting to establish a polynomial upper bound on the length of (certain) best improvement sequences for symmetric games on seriesparallel networks. Lemma 1 may be a good starting point in this direction, since the analysis of several of the cases considered in the proof also applies to series-parallel networks. As for the inefficiency of Nash equilibria, it would be interesting to establish matching upper and lower bounds on the pure Price of Anarchy for symmetric congestion games on series-parallel networks and on general networks, especially if these bounds turn up to be considerably better than the known bounds for general congestion games (see e.g. [4, 6, 9] ). common with p and does not intersect p at any vertex other than u and w. In addition, since u and w are connected by two internally disjoint paths p and σ i [u, w] , and since σ i and σ i [u, w] have some edges in common, by Proposition 1, σ i also contains u and w and does not have any edges in common with p . Hence the congestion of the edges of p is the same in both σ and σ .
Next we prove that the congestion of the edges of p does not change when player i moves from σ i to σ i . Let π = σ i [u, w] \ p and π = p \ σ i [u, w] be the segments where σ i [u, w] and p deviate from each other. Since π ∩ σ i = ∅, π and π are nonempty. Thus π and π are internally disjoint path segments with common endpoints, denoted u and w . Their first endpoint u appears no sooner than u and their last endpoint w appears no later than w on σ i and p. Since σ i has some edges in common with π , by Proposition 1, σ i contains u and w and does not intersect π at any vertex other than u and w . Furthermore, since all three paths p, σ i [u, w] and σ i [u, w] contain u and w , and since σ i [u, w] and σ i [u, w] deviate from p between u and w , by Proposition 2, the three paths share their u − u and w − w segments (see also 
